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ABSTRACT
Problems of housing affordability have been afﬂicting parts of the UK,
especially the South East of England, for a number of years. The
problem is closely related to shortages in housing supply, which are, in
turn, largely associated with constraints imposed by the English land
planning system. A leading theory for explaining these constraints posits
that they reﬂect political economy forces that convey the interests of
current homeowners to planning decisions in disproportionate and
excessively inﬂuential ways. We test this theory by examining survey
data on public attitudes to house building in local communities; and by
investigating whether these attitudes are related to local planning
decisions. We ﬁnd that there is a tendency for owner-occupiers to
express greater opposition to local house building and that, in the
decade to 2011, the housing stock grew signiﬁcantly less in local
authorities with higher proportions of owner-occupiers among local
households. The results suggest the risk that planning decisions might
have been distorted in favour of current homeowners is real and
economically signiﬁcant. We discuss a range of historical, socio-
economic and policy trends that help explain why successive
governments of various stripes have been reluctant to address head-on
problems in housing supply and put a curb on house prices.
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1. Introduction
Problems of housing affordability have been afﬂicting parts of UK for a number of years and are
especially acute for families with low-to-modest incomes (Barker 2004).1 The growth and volatility
of real house prices over the last 40 years in the UK are among the top of the Organisation for Econ-
omic Co-operation and Development rankings (Figure A1). The size of new houses has been decreas-
ing and is now smaller than in many other advanced economies such as the Netherlands, Germany
and the USA, where house prices are also cheaper than in the UK.2
More than 3.3 m adults between the ages of 20 and 34 were living with parents in 2013 – more
than a quarter of the total – according to data from the Labour Force Survey.3 Among those who have
afforded to buy a house, it has been estimated that the number of households struggling to keep up
with their mortgage payments is likely to double to 2.3 million by 2018 under a scenario of small,
gradual interest rate rises as suggested by the Bank of England (Blacklock and Whittaker 2014).4
The problem is intimately related to shortages in housing supply (e.g. Barker 2004, 2006, Allmen-
dinger et al. 2005, Bramley and Leishman 2005, Hilber and Vermeulen 2010, Caldera and Johansson
2013, Hilber 2015). In the 19 years from 1969 to 1989, over 4.3 million houses were built in England,
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while in the 19 years from 1994 to 2012, despite signiﬁcant acceleration in population growth, fewer
than 2.7 million houses were built.5 England’s population is projected to grow by around 7 million
over the next 20 years, driven by high birth rates, increased life expectancy and net inwards
migration.6 Given recent patterns of household formation, it has been estimated that we need to
build around 240,000 homes a year to accommodate this increase (Holmans 2013). Yet, we have
only built an average of 137,000 homes per year over the last 10 years.7
Existing empirical evidence suggests that shortages in housing supply are associated with con-
straints imposed by the English (land) planning system.8 ‘Planning’ is used here in a relatively
broad sense to include: (i) national policy set out in planning acts and planning policy statements;
(ii) local plans and development control practice and (iii) other policies and processes (e.g. those
related to the provision of infrastructure) that affect the fulﬁlment of planning conditions.
A leading theory for explaining these constraints posits that they reﬂect the interplay of political
economy forces underlying the housing market, such that the interests of current homeowners are
disproportionately represented and excessively inﬂuential in planning decisions (e.g. Cheshire et al.
1992, Fischel 2001, Glaeser et al. 2005, Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2013). Some of the key features of
the English planning system, and the wider institutional environment where it operates, are likely to
exacerbate that problem. Among the existing evidence we review in this paper, three such features
standout: (i) weak or absent city-wide/regional planning coordination; (ii) high ﬁscal centralisation
and (iii) ‘development control’ (i.e. any change of land use being subject to planning permissions
rather than to a general set of rules).
While political economy explanations of housing supply shortages in England have been pro-
posed before (e.g. Evans 1991, Pennington 2002), they have not, as far as we are aware, been
exposed to systematic empirical testing. This paper seeks to address this gap. We do it in three steps.
First, we discuss a set of historical, background trends in public attitudes towards homeownership,
government policy and the economy that were highly inﬂuential in shaping the current political
economy landscape around housing in England: for example, the long-term rise of homeownership,
especially in the second half of the last century, incentivised by an array of policy initiatives; the
decline in the construction of council houses in the 1970s; the vast increase in the market value of
the housing assets of themiddle classes from the late 1970s onwards, andwith it, the spreading of per-
ceptions in the electorate that homeownership is a golden ticket for individual prosperity; the ever
greater reliance of the ﬁnancial sector on property prices; and the rise of local community opposition
to house building. These trends help to explain why successive governments of various stripes have
been reluctant to address head-on problems in housing supply and, thus, put a curb on house prices.
Second, we use survey data on public attitudes to local housing development to examine (partial)
correlations between opposition to house building and a series of social, demographic and political
features that characterise the survey respondents.
Third, we investigate if those attitudes/preferences have an impact on local planning decisions.
This involves multivariate regression analysis of the empirical association between the growth of
the housing stocks in 349 English local authorities, between 2001 and 2011, and a range of variables
capturing the proportion of local households who are owner-occupiers; the proportion of local devel-
opable land; local electoral results; and various economic, demographic and regional controls. Our
central ﬁnding is that, in the decade to 2011, the housing stock grew signiﬁcantly less in local auth-
orities with higher proportions of owner-occupiers among local households. This suggests the risk
that planning decisions might have been distorted in favour of current homeowners is real and econ-
omically signiﬁcant.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a brief review of historical shifts in
public attitudes to housing, as well as economic, social and policy trends that have come to shape
the political economy of housing in England. Section 3 examines the origins of the rise in house
prices from the perspective of market fundamentals of supply and demand. Planning restrictions
are found to play a dominant role in house price increases in certain parts of England, so Section
4 starts our investigation of the root causes of these restrictions, examining the theory behind
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opposition to local housing development. Section 5 uses an empirical approach to address the same
question. It brieﬂy reviews the existing literature and presents our own empirical analysis. Section 6
offers some concluding thoughts.
2. The political economy of housing in England: long-run social and political trends
Homeownership was on the rise for most of the twentieth century, especially from 1953 onwards. It
has been the dominant form of tenure since the early 1970s.9 A succession of governments encour-
aged and protected homeownership, which was seen as core to the interests and aspirations of the
general public, and was increasingly relied upon as a model of private asset-based welfare, and a
vehicle for ﬁnancialised growth strategies (e.g. Kemeny 2005, Schwartza and Seabrookeb 2008,
Watson 2008, Ansell 2014, Montgomerie and Büdenbender 2015). A wide range of policy instruments
were used to help people buy a home. Some of the most signiﬁcant examples include mortgage tax
relief (which has since been abolished); capital gains tax relief; high loan-to-value ratios; no imputed
rental incomes; a regressive local property (council) tax and the ‘Right to Buy’ scheme that helped
tenants to buy their local authority home at a discount. Crucially, most of these initiatives focused
on increasing affordability through favourable tax treatment of homeownership and improving
access to credit, rather than increasing housing supply.
From the late 1970s onwards, the rise in homeownership met an increasingly unresponsive
housing supply. Challenging economic conditions in the early 1980s imposed hard ﬁscal constraints
on local authorities, which found it increasingly difﬁcult to ﬁnance the building of new social housing.
The election of Margaret Thatcher as British Prime Minister in 1979 brought important changes in the
political approach to social housing (e.g. through the ‘Right to Buy’ scheme) and to the post-war
intention to address the bulk of housing needs with public sector-led urban regeneration pro-
grammes and by constructing new and expanded towns. At the same time, lack of effective regional
planning coordination left local authorities to pursue mostly defensive, negative planning policies.
Property prices soared in England between 1982 and 1989 – approximately 80 per cent growth in
real terms.10 They fell sharply but brieﬂy from 1989 to the mid-1990s (about 40 per cent in real terms),
and then increased again dramatically till the great recession in 2008 (about 150 per cent in real
terms). With soaring house prices came large increases in wealth for a vast number of homeowners,
which is likely to have contributed to disseminating the idea that homeownership is a ticket for indi-
vidual prosperity and that ‘getting on the housing ladder’ is of utmost importance.
Data from the 2010 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey on public perceptions about homeowner-
ship suggested that the vast majority of the public would prefer to buy a house then to rent. The
most-commonly cited advantage of ownership is that it represents a good investment.11 With
respect to problems of affordability and how government might try to address them, most of the
public seemed to think that government should give ﬁnancial assistance to ﬁrst-time buyers and
increase access to mortgages.12 In the 2010 BSAS, overall, those who opposed building more
homes in their local areas seemed to outnumber those who supported it.
The rise of homeownership, together with strong increases in real house prices in parts of the
country, has led to the creation of very strong ties between the housing market and the macro
economy. Property prices have become critical to individuals’ long-term ﬁnancial security, access
to credit and consumption. The performance of the housing market has also become important to
the health of the UK ﬁnancial system, since about 80 per cent of the lending of UK banks supports
household mortgages or commercial property (Turner 2014).
The weight of homeowners in the electorate, the shape of public preferences about homeowner-
ship and housing policy and the close ties with the macro-economy help to explain why successive
governments have exhibited an ambivalent approach to easing supply restrictions and putting a curb
on house prices. It is an ambivalence that cuts through the (conﬂicting) views and interests of the
electorate itself, and that is compounded by the potential effects on the performance of the
economy as a whole.
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In his 2014 Mansion House Speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Osborne, was particularly
candid in his remarks about these contradictions:
The challenge is that we want several things which don’t sit comfortably together. For most people, their home is
the biggest investment of their lifetime. And, of course, they want that asset to increase in value over time. But a
home is also a place to live and build our lives – and we want all families to be able to afford security, comfort and
peace of mind. That means homes have to be affordable – whether you’re renting or buying. The only way that
can be achieved over the long term is by building more, so supply better matches demand. But we are a small and
crowded island, keen to protect our green spaces and ready to object to new development. So the British people
want our homes to go up in value, but also remain affordable; and we want more homes built, just not next to us.
You can see why no one has managed yet to solve the problems of Britain’s housing market. (Extract from
Osborne 2014)
Governments of various stripes have also been struggling to ﬁnd a sensible balance between foster-
ing a balanced representation of interests in planning decisions, which requires some form of
regional/national planning coordination, and ensuring that planning decisions are accountable to
local communities. The planning reforms adopted by the 2010–2015 coalition government are a
case in point. When that administration came into power in 2010, it took a number of steps to
implement a ‘localism’ agenda, including returning power to local government to determine
housing need and abolishing centrally determined ‘targets’; dismantling the regional planning appar-
atus; and strengthening community control through ‘neighbourhood development plans’ and
‘neighbourhood development orders’. Two years later, however, the Government introduced
changes to planning rules pulling in the opposite direction. The National Planning Policy Framework
(NPPF), published in March 2012, included a highly controversial ‘presumption in favour of sustain-
able development’, calling on authorities to adopt the default position of granting planning per-
mission unless there is clear cause not to. It signalled the return of an element of strategic
leadership above the local level (Gallent et al. 2013).
In July 2015, the Conservative Government announced additional reforms to the planning system
designed to streamline and speed up local planning processes; intervene in those local authorities
that fail to produce a timely plan to accommodate future housing need; strengthen cooperation
between local authorities; use development corporations to deliver higher density development in
commuter transport hubs; give new planning powers to mayors and combined authorities and
create a ‘zonal system’ for statutory registers of brownﬁeld land, which will be granted automatic
planning permission (HMT 2015). Taken together, these reforms represent a signiﬁcant departure
from the ‘localism agenda’ of 2010 of the previous government.
3. The problem: housing supply and planning constraints
With relatively abundant land, relatively ﬂexible land regulation and little binding topographical con-
straints, one would expect the supply of urban land to be more or less perfectly elastic and house
prices to be mainly driven by construction costs, so that they would be stable or even slightly
decreasing in the long run owing to technical progress in the construction industry (Glaeser et al.
2008, Cheshire et al. 2014). This is consistent with evidence from long-run trends in house prices
in countries where the supply of land is relatively ﬂexible, for example, Germany, Switzerland and
parts of the USA (Figure A1). It is also in line with the experience of England and Wales until the
late 1960s (Figure A2). Between 1892 and the last pre-WWII population census in 1931, there was
a 61per cent increase in household numbers and a 25 per cent increase in real household
incomes, but no increase in the real price of housing land. The construction of transport systems –
suburban railways and roads – and other infrastructure, expanded usable urban land supply at a
more or less constant real cost.
This contrasts markedly with the post-war experience, after development control was enacted in
1947. Between 1955 and 2008, real house prices increased by a factor of 4.5 (mainly since 1971). This
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growth was intimately related to the changes in the real price of housing land, which in the same
period increased by a factor of 12.3 (Cheshire et al. 2014).
In most local areas in England, the effects of physical constraints (e.g. scarcity of developable land,
presence of steep slopes or ﬂood plains) on house prices is generally small (Hilber and Vermeulen
2010). In the most urbanised areas, lack of developable land is important, but regulatory restrictions
(in the form of height restrictions) also play a signiﬁcant role in constraining development. The Fore-
sight Land Use Futures (2010) showed that 9.95 per cent of England was in urban development,
almost half of this in the form of parks or gardens. Domestic and industrial and commercial buildings
accounted for just 1.8 per cent of England’s surface.
Rising house prices in England have been found to be mainly driven by supply constraints associ-
ated with the planning system (Barker 2004, 2006, 2008, Allmendinger et al. 2005, Bramley and Leish-
man 2005, Nickell 2009, Hilber and Vermeulen 2010, Caldera and Johansson 2013). The perverse
effects of urban containment policies were noted as early as 1973 (Hall et al. 1973), and were put
under the spotlight by an independent review of UK housing supply commissioned by the Labour
Government in 2003, which concluded that ‘the underlying constraint on housing is the supply of
land’ (Barker 2003: 10).
In explaining what drives this constraint, the Barker Review drew attention to the planning system
and its inﬂuence over the amount of land which is made available and the delivery of necessary infra-
structure; the increasingly complex nature of sites (especially brownﬁeld), where signiﬁcant remedia-
tion might be required; the complexities of land ownership and difﬁculties in site assembly where
ownership is fragmented; weak local incentives to develop land; and the politically contentious
nature of land use at the local level (local communities often worry about the possible loss of
open space, the changing nature of their town or village, potential impact of development on prop-
erty values, and increased pressure on infrastructure and local services). The Review also noted that,
with limited land supply, competition in the house building industry tends to focus on land acqui-
sition rather than on satisfying consumers. Its proﬁtability depends on obtaining valuable land
rather than building high-quality homes.
In 2012, a study of the impact of restricting housing supply on house prices and affordability, com-
missioned by the now extinct National Housing and Planning Advice Unit, investigated the causal
role of English planning policies in raising the price of housing, controlling for the effects of physical
restrictions on land supply such as areas of water and the fact that land is already developed or is
unbuildable for other reasons such as its steepness (Hilber and Vermeulen 2010). The study con-
cluded that, while the effects of physical restrictions are signiﬁcant, their contribution to variations
in house prices is small relative to variations in planning restrictiveness across local authorities.
According to their central estimates, if the South East, the most regulated English region, had the
regulatory restrictiveness of the North East, the least restrictive English region but still highly regu-
lated in an international context, house prices in the South East would be approximately roughly
25 per cent lower.
In 2014, Sir Michael Lyons led a review charged with setting out the changes to housing and plan-
ning policies required to deliver these new homes. The review concluded that ‘artiﬁcial scarcity of
land’ for housing had created distortion in the land market. It issued a variety of recommendations
designed to strengthen the responsibility of councils to identify sufﬁcient land for new homes in local
plans (including interventions of the planning inspectorate if they failed to do so), while ensuring that
their ability to deliver these plans was also improved (e.g. through increased devolution of funding).
The sharp increase in house prices in England over the last 40 years cannot be attributed to supply
factors alone. Increases in real income combined with declining long-term real interest rates, easing
in credit conditions (until the Great Recession), population growth (including immigration) and
household fragmentation are all likely to have played important roles in increasing demand and in
driving up house prices (e.g. Barker 2008). But the failure of supply to accommodate the increase
in demand was ultimately the dominant driver of the increase in real house prices and rents.
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4. Opposition to housing development: the theory
The prevailing message so far is that restrictive planning approaches in some part of England, and in
the last few decades, are likely to be important in explaining rigidities in housing supply in those
areas and, as a result, increases in house prices. This, of course, raises the question of what is
driving those planning constraints. We now turn to this question, reviewing the theory that underpins
opposition to housing development.
New development may impose costs on local residents, some temporary (e.g. short-term disrup-
tion associated with the construction phase), some permanent (loss of amenities, congestion of local
facilities and infrastructure) with negative knock-on impacts on property values.13 If these costs mate-
rialise,14 they tend to be localised and of a signiﬁcant magnitude for those who bear them – typically
local residents (especially owner-occupiers) who might feel that they would lose out from develop-
ment, and who are easily mobilised and politically empowered to block development. The gains from
new development are usually dispersed, small, and uncertain from an individual perspective – mostly
would-be house-buyers, many of whom are not yet local voters, as well as renters who tend to be a
minority alongside owner-occupiers.
These asymmetries have important consequences. First, local support for development is likely to
be sensitive to the costs that it imposes on local communities, especially when there is no compen-
sating mechanism in place (e.g. Fischel 2001). Second, planning decisions made exclusively at the
local level may fail to allow for the full range of interests affected by development, and increase
the risk of property rights re-allocation to existing homeowners.15 Third, local planning controls
may have impacts on the demand for land and housing in other (usually neighbouring) areas,
leading local authorities to engage in non-cooperative, strategic interactions to the detriment of
regional and national prosperity (Brueckner 1995, Helsley and Strange 1995). There are a number
of features of the governance of housing supply in England that are likely to exacerbate these
problems.
Planning decisions in England are mostly devolved to local authorities. It is not their role to initiate
development but to designate preferred amounts, types and locations of dwellings, through formal
planning frameworks and associated statements of policy, which are nested within a national plan-
ning policy (now uniﬁed as the NPPF), and until recently, a range of regional strategies. Developers
apply for planning permissions for schemes they wish to initiate. Their applications are evaluated by
local authorities through the process of development control, which where ‘local planning principles
and politics are played out’ (Ball 2010: 12).
Direct ‘affected party’ consultation is an important component of English development control,
much more so than in many other countries where it is limited to the plan formulation stage, or
not even contemplated at all. Consultation usually involves local people and a variety of agencies
in the assessments of planning applications. A series of discussions take place with developers,
who may have to resubmit proposals, or appeal to planning inspectors, before being given ﬁnal
approval. Some will have their schemes rejected altogether (Ball 2010).
In the English planning system, any change of land use legally deﬁned as ‘development’16 is
subject to development control and requires individual planning permission. This stands in stark con-
trast to the planning principles of some other countries such as the Netherlands, Germany and the
USA where developers have the legal right to put their plans in practice with only administrative
approval, and without the need to seek ‘development permission’, as long as these plans conform
to the requirements set down by planning regulations for the particular site.
Development control has been found to promote uncertainty and delays, raising the expected
returns that developers require for a project to be viable, and rendering the supply of housing less
‘price elastic’ (Pendall 1999, Mayer and Somerville 2000, Mayo and Sheppard 2001, Ball and Allmen-
dinger 2008, Killian and Pretty 2008, NAO 2008). The complexities and uncertainties associated with
development control also seem to have important implications for the structure and behaviour of the
construction industry. It is likely to incentivise developers to build up land banks; it increases the
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number of planning applications required for a given level of output; it slows their response to
increases in demand; and it acts as a disincentive for market entry and therefore damages compe-
tition in the sector (e.g. OFT 2008, Ball 2010).
England has a highly centralised ﬁscal system which offers few explicit incentives for local auth-
orities to facilitate urban development. Local authorities have statutory obligations to provide ser-
vices for new residents, but receive little direct return from them to their tax revenues. Around 23
per cent of budgeted revenue expenditure of English local authorities in 2013–2014 is estimated
to be funded through council tax (Young 2013). Evidence from other countries (e.g. Bassett and
Malpass 2013, Monk et al. 2013)17 suggests that this plays an important role in shaping the willing-
ness of local communities to accommodate development.18
There have been attempts to capture some of the ‘planning gain’ that comes with changes in land
designation. ‘Section 106’ agreements require developers to commit to providing community
beneﬁts such as infrastructure, open space and/or low-cost homes in the development, in return
for planning permission. The Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) allows local authorities in
England and Wales to charge a fee on new developments to support development by funding infra-
structure that the council, local community and neighbourhoods want, like new or safer road
schemes, park improvements or a new health centre (Smith 2014).Yet, ‘Section 106’ and CIL
capture a relatively small part of the value uplift that arises from granting planning permission,
involve high transaction costs and their application has raised concerns about transparency, predict-
ability and consistency (Nickell 2009, Mirrlees et al. 2011, CLGC 2014).
In 2011, the coalition government introduced a ‘New Homes Bonus’ scheme aimed at encouraging
local authorities to grant planning permissions for the building of new houses in return for additional
revenue (Wilson 2015). The National Audit Ofﬁce published a report on the impact of the New Homes
Bonus in March 2013, where it noted that, while it was too early to assess whether the scheme would
increase house building, it had found ‘little evidence that the Bonus had yet made signiﬁcant changes
to local authorities’ behaviour towards increasing housing supply’, and that it had ‘mainly rewarded
home creation that was not incentivised by the Bonus’ (NAO 2013: 11).
England is also an outlier in having weak regional layers of planning governance. This promotes
political fragmentation, which has been found to have important impacts on several dimensions of
urban development, including density, the spatial extent of urbanised land area and property values
(Fulton et al. 2001, Glaeser et al. 2001, Carruthers, 2002, 2003, Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002, Searl
and Filion 2011). For example, it has been estimated that since the abolition of ‘regional spatial strat-
egies’ in 2010, there has been a reduction of about 8 per cent of land previously allocated for housing
with the largest reductions occurring in the highest-demand regions (Morton 2012).
International experience suggests that attempts to make housing supply more responsive to
demand and to create more sustainable development patterns involved some degree of rebalancing
of planning powers from the local to the state level. The triggers for reform included competitive
pressures between cities striving to attract investment; increasing inﬂuence of the development
industry on state governments and rising public concern regarding the economic and environmental
sustainability of urban sprawl.19
5. Opposition to housing development: the empirical evidence
The previous section discussed features of the governance of land in England that are likely to have
an impact on planning decisions and, therefore, on housing supply. After brieﬂy reviewing existing
empirical studies of the drivers of land-use regulation, this section presents new empirical evidence
around political economy drivers of planning restrictions in England.
It has been noted that residents may object to proposed housing developments for many reasons:
the particular design of a structure; effects on neighbourhood character; added trafﬁc; the possibility
of ‘undesirable’ people moving in to the neighbourhood; effects on public services or loss of open
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space. Most of these motives are linked to concerns about local property values (Haselhoff and Ong
2007).
Yet, very few empirical studies focus on individual motivations underpinning opposition to
housing development. The classic reference is Pendall (1999). It examined 182 development projects
in the San Francisco Bay Area in the 1980s and tried to identify aspects of proposals, sites, surround-
ings or processes that tended to be associated with protest. He found that affordable housing and
multi-family developments were most likely to cause opposition, but the explanatory power of his
models was weak.
There is, however, a ﬂourishing theoretical literature focusing on the drivers of planning restric-
tions which has been expanding to include empirical tests. These tests are almost exclusively
focused on North American cities and the results are still widely contested. Some of the variables
that have been studied include population growth/density (e.g. Bates and Santerre 1994, Evenson
and Wheaton 2003, Glaeser and Ward 2009), income (e.g. Pogodzinski and Sass 1994, Evenson
and Wheaton 2003, McDonald and McMillen 2004), local political ideology (e.g. Kahn 2011) and
homeownership rate (e.g. Dubin et al. 1992, Clingermayer 1993, Pogodzinski and Sass 1994, Brueck-
ner 1998, Glaeser and Ward 2009, Gordon 2009).
Another strand of literature has focused instead on homeowners’ support/opposition to individual
projects or policy initiatives that are perceived to have an impact on property values. These studies
have tended to ﬁnd support for the hypothesis, discussed in Section 1, that local planning decisions
are likely to be inﬂuenced by the interests of homeowners in protecting the value of their houses (e.g.
Brunner et al. 2001, Brunner and Sonstelie 2003, Dehring et al. 2008, Hilber and Mayer 2009, Ahlfeldt
and Maennig 2012). The inﬂuence of pressure groups other than resident homeowners has only been
tested in a handful of cases (e.g. Lubell et al. 2005, Glaeser and Ward 2009, Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-
Marsal 2011, Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2013, Schone et al. 2013). Tests of strategic interactions/non-
cooperative behaviour between local planning units are even scarcer (e.g. Brueckner 1998, Schone
et al. 2013).
As far as we are aware, similar research focused on the English housing market is conﬁned to
exploratory work by Hilber et al. (2014), and a small number of case studies of the English countryside,
offering anecdotal evidence that planning processes have been subverted in ways that favour the
exclusionary preferences of certain groups (e.g. Sturzaker 2010, Powe and Hart 2011). There is also
some qualitative evidence suggesting that interests represented at the local level (parish councils
in particular) are likely to be skewed towards those of property owners and older residents (e.g.
Gallent and Robinson 2012, Gallent et al. 2013).
Ball (2010), for example, presents evidence from interviews with planners in four local authorities
in England, where there are reports that:
new house building in middle-class neighbourhoods, or in what were seen locally as areas of ‘architectural inter-
est and heritage’, was vociferously opposed and local meetings well attended. It was stated that although there
was local sympathy with the issue of housing need, there was little direct support for the need to build new
housing. For many people the link between local housing affordability and housing supply was not clear. It
was difﬁcult to get individuals to share a common ground – for many people these issues appeared to relate
to their own pre-conceived ideals. (Ball 2010: 64)
There is, however, little systematic, quantitative evidence around these issues. To help ﬁll this gap, we
used data from the 2010 BSA survey – the ﬁrst to include a detailed section on housing – to inves-
tigate the drivers of opposition to development, and in particular, possible associations with social,
economic, political and individual characteristics. The BSA is an annual survey conducted by
NatCen which interviews over 3000 adults in the UK on a number of topics, using a random prob-
ability sampling technique to arrive at a representative sample. In the 2010 BSA survey, 29 per
cent of respondents supported more homes being built in the local area while 46 per cent
opposed and 23 per cent neither supported nor opposed. Support was particularly high among
those renting from a local authority (46 per cent) or from a housing association (47 per cent), followed
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by private renters (33 per cent), and particularly low for homeowners (just 23 per cent support). Inter-
estingly, the proportion of private renters that opposed development (36 per cent) was greater than
the proportion that supported it (33 per cent).20
Our aim was to test for signiﬁcant correlations between background characteristics of respondents
and their attitudes towards house building. We ran a probit regression model where the question
‘Would you support or oppose more homes being built in your local area?’ was used as a dependent
(binary) variable (OppHom), which took the value ‘1’ if respondents ‘oppose’ or ‘oppose strongly’
homes being built in their local area.21 The independent variables in our model include dummies
for owner-occupiers (‘1’ if the respondent was a homeowner and ‘0’ otherwise); political party prefer-
ence (Labour and Conservative preferences based on the question ‘Do you think of yourself as a little
closer to one political party than to the others?’); as well as controls for age, income and geographical
location.22 Age and income were also treated as categorical variables to test for robustness of results.
The analysis was performed using sampling weights provided by the BSA to correct for the prob-
ability of certain sections of the sample being overrepresented.23 The results are presented in
Table 1.
Owner-occupiers, party preferences, and residence in a big city were all found to be statistically
signiﬁcant. With all other variables at their respective means, the probability of opposition to
house building increased from 37 to 50 per cent if the respondent was an owner-occupier. Prefer-
ences for the conservative party were associated with a higher probability of opposition (from 44
to 50 per cent), while respondents with Labour party preferences were less likely express opposition
to local housing development (from 48 to 41 per cent), as were respondents from big cities (down to
36 from 47 per cent).
We replicated our analysis with data from the 2013 BSA survey. The results need to be interpreted
with caution since the question on opposition to house building, in this case, applies to a much
smaller sample (∼1000). Owner-occupiers were still found to be signiﬁcantly associated with a
higher probability of opposition to local house building, but none of the other explanatory variables
was robustly signiﬁcant. The lack of signiﬁcance of the political variables is particularly interesting, as
it could suggest increasing cross-party support for house building.
All in all, these ﬁndings lend some empirical support to the hypothesis that homeowners are more
likely to be sensitive to anything that might have an impact on the value of their houses and, there-
fore, more likely to oppose local housing development. The next step is to investigate whether, in
practice, this actually matters, that is, whether homeowners’ preferences and interests inﬂuence
local planning decisions. If they did, this would raise concerns about the range of interests reﬂected
in local planning, and thus, their political legitimacy.
Table 1. Probit regression results.
Number of observations = 2795
Wald chi2(8) = 85.02 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Pseudo R2 = 0.0298
Log pseudolikelihood =−1904.7616
OppHom Coef. Std. err. Z P > z [95% conf. Interval]
Age 0.002 0.002 1.210 0.227 −0.001 0.005
Owner-Occupiera 0.344 0.065 5.300 0.000 0.217 0.471
High Income 0.012 0.061 0.200 0.845 −0.107 0.131
Conservativeb 0.143 0.067 2.130 0.033 0.011 0.274
Labourb −0.165 0.067 −2.470 0.014 −0.297 −0.034
Big Cityb −0.289 0.118 −2.440 0.015 −0.521 −0.057
Small City −0.033 0.070 −0.480 0.633 −0.171 0.104
Suburbs 0.072 0.079 0.920 0.358 −0.082 0.226
_cons −0.403 0.115 −3.520 0.000 −0.628 −0.179
a
P < .01.
b
P < .05.
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Some might argue that whole point of having local authorities is precisely to ensure that land-use
regulation reﬂects the preferences and interests of local residents. There are, however, three funda-
mental problems with this view. First, in such a world, the interests of prospective buyers and renters,
who by deﬁnition are not local residents, would tend to be ignored. Second, pure local accountability
would amount to a fundamental change in the terms and conditions that underpinned the transfer of
property rights to the original owners of the local housing stock many years ago. For most of the
second half of the last century, there was an expectation that housing supply would respond to
increases in demand, through publicly led urban regeneration development and the creation of
new cities. This expectation was reﬂected in property prices. Changing social contract so that the
planning system becomes purely accountable to local residents would amount to a fundamental
redistribution of property rights, across tenures and across generations. Third, where homeowners
oppose local housing development because of concerns about lack of accompanying investment
in infrastructure and public services, it would still be the case that planning decisions responding
to those fears would be more a by-product of policy failures than outcome of a healthy local demo-
cratic process.
We took these issues to the data, investigating the drivers of English local authorities’ willingness
to expand their residential dwelling stock. We tested the empirical association between the growth of
local dwelling stocks (our dependent variable) and a range of variables, including: the proportion of
local households who are owner-occupiers; the proportion of local developable land (i.e. land that is
not already built nor subject to administrative or natural restrictions – e.g. greenbelts and national
parks); local electoral results; and a series of economic, demographic and regional controls.
The empirical tests are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using a cross-section of
up to 349 English local authorities.24 The explanatory variables are measured in or around 2001. The
growth of local authorities’ dwelling stock (our dependent variable) covers the 2001–2011 period.
Variable deﬁnitions, descriptive statistics and details of their spatial distribution are presented in
the Appendix.
Before we discuss our results, our choice of dependent variable bears some further elaboration.
We have used the growth of the dwelling stock in local authorities as an indicator of the willingness
of local authorities to allow their housing stock to expand, and therefore, as an indicator of local auth-
ority regulatory restrictiveness. One obvious alternative would be to use the rejection/refusal rate of
planning applications at the local authority level, but this has two important limitations. First, there
are a signiﬁcant number of local authorities in our data where both the refusal rate and the growth of
their dwelling stock are relatively high (Figure A3). In other words, high refusal rates per se do not
imply high restrictiveness, deﬁned as relatively low willingness to accommodate further housing
development in the local area. For a given number of planning applications, local authorities can
adjust their refusal rate so as to achieve the amount of development they are willing to accept.
Second, the planning application data available does not contain information on the exact
number of new dwellings that were submitted to a local authority, but only on the number of appli-
cations that concerned 10 or more dwellings (so-called ‘major residential planning applications’).
Differences in the average number of dwellings per planning application between local areas
could distort comparisons of refusal rates across different local authorities.
Our main results are presented in Table 2. They suggest that there is a negative, statistically sig-
niﬁcant association between the proportion of owner-occupiers among local households and the
growth of local authorities’ dwelling stock. The magnitude of the effect remains stable across a
range of speciﬁcations and the variable is always signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. In (2), our bench-
mark model with region-ﬁxed effects, a 10 percentage point higher proportion of homeowners is
associated with a 1.2 percentage point lower dwelling stock growth between 2001 and 2011
(average growth was 8.75 per cent). This is about a third of a standard deviation in dwelling stock
growth, which is a non-trivial effect.
The estimate of the coefﬁcient for our indicator of developable land is statistically signiﬁcant
and positive. A 10 percentage point higher proportion of developable land is associated with
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approximately 0.47 percentage point higher dwelling stock growth. As we move from low to high
shares of developable land, we are usually moving from local authorities characterised by dense
urban areas to local authorities composed of rural villages and/or small cities surrounded by country-
side. There are various possible interpretations for this association. For example, local authorities
where land is relatively abundant (i.e. where there are greater opportunities for greenﬁeld develop-
ment) could face less community opposition than local authorities that rely more on inﬁll develop-
ment. The correlation could be reﬂecting the fact that it is technically more challenging (and, thus,
more expensive) to build in densely populated areas. It could also be capturing the interests/lobbying
of owners of undeveloped land (e.g. Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2013). Our model does not shed light
on the merits of these different interpretations, so we remain agnostic about the exact nature of this
association, but decide to keep the variable in the model as a control.
We have also controlled for the degree of local authority attractiveness measured by the
number of planning applications received relative to the local housing stock. This variable is stat-
istically signiﬁcant and positive, with a unit increase associated with 1.1 percentage points higher
growth. Again, we can only speculate about the mechanisms underpinning this correlation. It could
be that local authorities receiving higher numbers of planning applications (relative to their dwell-
ing stock) have options to grow in ways that other local authorities do not, for example, by tapping
into a wider pool of high-quality planning applications. In contrast, one might expect property
owners in more attractive local authorities to have stronger incentives to oppose development,
which would support a correlation in the opposite direction – that is, all else being constant,
the growth of the local dwelling stock in more attractive local authorities would tend to be
smaller than in other areas. As in the previous case, we include the variable in the model as a
control.
We also introduced a range of other controls in (3) and (4) (e.g. household density and income)
which turned out not to be signiﬁcant or only marginally so.
Table 2. OLS regression results.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Owner-occupier households −11.59***
(1.694)
−12.16***
(1.954)
−14.08***
(2.224)
−14.53***
(2.293)
−11.46***
(2.143)
−14.01***
(2.028)
−11.85***
(2.042)
Developable land 4.614***
(0.573)
4.772***
(0.609)
4.658***
(0.614)
4.740***
(0.623)
4.599***
(0.635)
4.576***
(0.623)
4.659***
(0.624)
Planning applications
relative to dwelling stock
1.193***
(0.102)
1.104***
(0.107)
1.107***
(0.106)
1.094***
(0.108)
1.114***
(0.111)
1.025***
(0.111)
1.075***
(0.109)
Structurally not controlled
local authorities
0.963**
(0.448)
0.951**
(0.439)
1.029**
(0.440)
1.037**
(0.440)
0.874*
(0.470)
0.828*
(0.444)
0.891**
(0.449)
Household density −0.0382
(0.0233)
−0.0387*
(0.0233)
Median income (log) 1.144
(1.424)
Labour controlled local
authorities
0.146
(0.491)
Conservative controlled local
authorities
−0.321
(0.422)
Region dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 10.16***
(1.230)
11.92***
(1.568)
13.85***
(1.927)
3.133
(13.47)
11.57***
(1.699)
13.84***
(1.653)
11.76***
(1.642)
Observations 349 349 348 348 331 319 333
R
2 0.434 0.485 0.491 0.492 0.473 0.465 0.472
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions run using linear OLS with dwelling stock growth as the dependent variable.
Our benchmark results in (1) are robust to the inclusion of region-ﬁxed effects in (2), density in (3) and income in (4). In (5), we
include categorical variables for districts that have been controlled by one of the major parties for 8 or more years between 1998
and 2008. In (6), we drop districts with very low growth and low refusal rates. In (7), we drop districts with high growth and low
income. The results stay broadly unchanged.
* P < .1.
** P < .05.
*** P < .01.
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The results for our political variables suggest that there might be a positive difference in dwelling
stock growth between the group of local authorities that have remained mostly under no overall
control by any one party between 1998 and 2008 vis-à-vis other local authorities. All else constant,
local authorities in the former group are associated with approximately 1 percentage point higher
growth. We also introduced dummies for local authorities controlled by either of the two parties
(5) and found that these do not seem to have a signiﬁcant association with growth, suggesting
that it is control that matters, not political complexion. We should note, however, that these are ten-
tative results, which depend on the way political control is deﬁned/measured.25 Also, at this stage, we
could only speculate as to the intuition behind this association.
We ran a series of robustness checks. We dropped from our sample (6) districts that had simul-
taneously low refusal rates and low dwelling stock growth, as these were likely to be relatively
depressed areas where dwelling growth was constrained by lack of planning applications. In those
cases, our dependent variable is not a good indicator of local authorities’ willingness to expand. In
(7), we dropped districts with high growth rates and low income to test whether our results were
being biased by growth being ‘dumped’ in low-income areas. Both speciﬁcations left our major
results unchanged. Additionally, we experimented with small changes to the deﬁnitions of our vari-
ables (e.g. the benchmark used for the number of years that local authorities where uncontrolled
required for them to be classiﬁed as such) and also used robust standard errors to correct for possible
heteroscedasticity. The pattern of results stayed the same.
All in all, our results show a robust empirical association between homeownership and increases in
housing supply. The nature of our analysis is such that it does not enable us to establish a nexus of
causality between the two. This is, however, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst time that such a
correlation has been established with UK data.
The results also lend support to the thesis that the amount of developable land available at the
local level plays a signiﬁcant role in the way local authorities are able to accommodate demand
for development. This, in turn, highlights the importance of current debates about the effects of
greenbelts and the ability of existing cities to expand (Rudlin and Falk 2014). But a more sensible dis-
cussion of the impact of greenbelts, and of the trade-offs between greenﬁeld development and
environmental values, should be part of a wider debate about density.26
6. Conclusion and implications
Parts of England (the South East most clearly) are facing a housing crisis. House prices have risen by
about 150 per cent,27 in real terms, between the mid-1990s and 2008. People are being crammed into
ever smaller houses, and younger generations are increasingly priced out of the market and forced to
live longer with their parents. Huge redistribution has taken place from renters and prospective
house-buyers to some groups of homeowners. The rise in house prices has also been identiﬁed as
a source of ﬁnancial instability, and drag on business, and an important cause of the increase in
the share of income that goes to capital (Rognlie 2015).
The drivers of the increase in house prices are well known. Housing demand has been steadily
increasing, fuelled by rising real incomes, population growth (including immigration), household
fragmentation, declining long-term real interest rates and easing in credit conditions before the inter-
national ﬁnancial crisis. At the same time, housing supply has largely failed to accommodate the
increase in demand. The result is a substantial increase in real house prices and rents.
Our review of the existing evidence, together with new empirical analysis of public attitudes to
housing development and local planning decisions, suggests that, in the decade to 2011, supply con-
straints were the product of important failures in the governance of land in England, which tended to
favour the interests of current homeowners. We conclude, in particular, that planning decisions
mostly conﬁned to the local level are unlikely to allow for the full range of interests affected by devel-
opment, especially in the absence of effective city-wide/regional planning coordination. Groups
whose interests are not properly catered for include would-be house-buyers, many of whom are
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not even part of the local electorate, and renters who tend to be a minority alongside owner-occu-
piers. The problem is likely to be ampliﬁed by the requirement that any change of land use legally
deﬁned as ‘development’ be subject to individual planning permission; and by a highly centralised
ﬁscal system, which does not properly allow for the costs of infrastructure and public services that
are complementary to housing development. Moreover, limited competition in the construction
industry and incentives for developers to build up land banks are also likely to play a signiﬁcant
role in limiting housing supply (e.g. OFT 2008, Ball 2010).
These shortcomings in the governance of land/construction in England are set against dramatic
changes in housing policy and public attitudes to housing development over the last three
decades. The 1980s brought an end to major public sector-led urban regeneration programmes
and construction of new and expanded towns. At the same time, homeownership became the domi-
nant form of tenure, supported by a long series of demand-side policy interventions designed to help
people buy a home – most notably the ‘Right to Buy’. Soaring property prices in the 1980s and from
the mid-1990s till the international crisis in 2008 brought large increases in wealth for a vast number
of homeowners. It helped to consolidate the perception that rising prices are a regular, healthy
feature of the English housing market and a barometer of conﬁdence in the economy, and stimulated
the impetus to ‘get on the housing ladder’. A large part of the electorate took the view that the appro-
priate response to problems of housing affordability should simply involve government giving more
ﬁnancial assistance to ﬁrst-time buyers and increase access to mortgages. This was also the time
when local community opposition to housing development began to thrive.
The weight of homeowners in the electorate, the shape of public preferences about homeowner-
ship and housing policy, and the macroeconomic implications of housing wealth, all help explain why
successive governments proved to be ambivalent about intervening to ﬁx the foundations of housing
supply, and simply pandering to the interests of current homeowners. They also explain why insti-
tutional reform in this area is a particularly difﬁcult enterprise.
That said, there have been signs recently that this political economy landscape might be chan-
ging. First, we have been witnessing a structural shift in homeownership, which has been on a declin-
ing trend for about two decades (Figure A4), particularly among those born from the mid-1970s
onwards (Belﬁeld et al. 2014). Second, there have also been signs that voters’ preferences might
be changing. Survey data indicate that opposition to new homes fell substantially between 2010
and 2013, with 31 per cent of respondents in the BSA survey saying that they would oppose new
homes being built in their local area in 2013, compared to 46 per cent in 2010. The data also
suggest that the proportion of respondents who supported new house building increased from 28
per cent in 2010 to 47 per cent in 2013. If the decline in homeownership were to continue, it
would imply a rebalancing of the electoral weight of groups in different housing tenures, and
could lead to increasing political pressure to boost housing supply. Shifts in public attitudes
towards housing could act as an additional catalyst for change.
The ultimate aim of this article is to shape the debate about the UK housing crisis. Our core argu-
ment is that the obsession with boosting demand through ﬁnancialisation and tax breaks should be
replaced with efforts to better understand the root causes of supply-side bottlenecks. This should be
taken as a starting point, however. Many issues deserve further attention. Clearly, we need to know
more about the inner workings of the planning system, and disentangle the economic and political
factors that are putting a brake on house building. But it is critical this research engage with the way
British political institutions constrain the incentives facing local and national politicians. In this
respect, the electoral politics of housing is an obvious focus for future studies.28 In the same vein,
scholars should pay more attention to the formation of distributional coalitions in favour and
against housing developments. The big question here is whether the shifting political equilibrium
– for example, the rise of the so-called ‘generation rent’– is actually going to shake the foundations
of a highly path-dependent housing regime. This means the new political economy of housing
should also focus on the politics of different forms of tenure, including the neglected area of
social housing.
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Finally, we are fully aware that much of the causal complexity surrounding our story cannot be
observed at the level of analysis used in this paper. Our work should, therefore, be supplemented
by qualitative case studies delving into the processes mediating public preferences and government
policy. This is crucial for validating our ﬁndings and developing a more nuanced understanding of the
speciﬁc mechanisms behind the ongoing housing crisis. Yet, whatever the remaining limitations,
there are strong reasons to believe that our ﬁndings are not simply capturing a set of spurious cor-
relations. There are, instead, likely to be reﬂecting conﬂicting and disquieting forces in the political
economy of housing in England, that have not gone unnoticed in Whitehall. In the words of Chan-
cellor Osborne in his 2014 Mansion House speech:
the British people want our homes to go up in value, but also remain affordable; and we want more homes built,
just not next to us. You can see why no one has managed yet to solve the problems of Britain’s housing market.
(Extract from Osborne 2014)
This article seeks to lead a new generation of research aimed at untangling this political economy
conundrum.
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government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-house-building.
8. See ESRC/BA (2014) for a good summary of the evidence.
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choose to rent. This ﬁgure has changed very little over the last 25 years; in 1996, 85per cent said that they would
choose to buy and 15 per cent said that they would choose to rent. When asked about the main advantage of
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16. For example, changing from agricultural to housing or housing to ofﬁce use; signiﬁcant increases in a building’s
size; changing the use of a shop from selling one product/service to selling another.
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amount of income from local property taxes.
18. For example, Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) investigate the effect of impact fees (to ﬁnance public infrastructure) on
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Bunker (2010), Williams and Maginn (2012), Hsieh et al. (2012) and Williams (2014) on Australia.
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23. Replicating our model without sampling weights produced very similar results.
24. Clariﬁcation of our unit of analysis is in order. We use local planning authorities as our unit of analysis as this is
where town planning powers reside. Local planning authorities’ boundaries coincide with those of metropolitan
boroughs, London boroughs, unitary authorities (UAs) and non-metropolitan districts, which have jurisdiction
over housing applications within their boundaries. Non-metropolitan districts were part of a two-tier system
with county councils till the 1990s but now wholly consist of authorities with district status or have been con-
verted to UAs through local government restructuring. The powers of county councils have been commensu-
rately reduced, being limited to aspects such as strategic planning, social services, education and ﬁre services.
25. More details about this deﬁnition can be found in the Appendix.
26. Not just density deﬁned as number of dwellings per hectare, but also density as ﬂoor space per hectare, so that
the height restrictions imposed by the planning system are taken into consideration. In this context, see White-
head (2008).
27. Based on data underlying Figure A2.
28. In this line, see the recent work by Lund (2015).
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Appendix
Figure A1. Real house prices, international comparison, 1975Q1–2013Q4, 1975Q1 = 100. Source: International House Price Data-
base, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Figure A2. Real land and house prices indices (1975 = 100), England and Wales. Source: Cheshire et al. (2014).
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Deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics
Dwelling stock growth
Dwelling stock by local planning authority for 2001 and 2011 was obtained from census data using
Nomis. Census deﬁnes ‘dwelling’ as a single self-contained household space, so these statistics count
only residential spaces.
For the 37 districts that were merged into larger UAs in the 2009 local government restructuring,
the annual series on Dwelling Stock Estimates (HM Government, Live tables on dwelling stock (includ-
ing vacants), GOV.UK website, 2014, Retrieved 16 October 2014 https://www.gov.uk/government/
Figure A3. Dwelling stock growth vs refusal rates.
Figure A4. Homeownership rates by birth year and age. Source: Belﬁeld et al. (2014) – Figure 3.1.3, using data from the Families
Expenditure Survey and the Family Resources Survey for various years.
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statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-dwelling-stock-including-vacants) was used to estimate share of
dwelling growth in future UAs, that could be attributed to individual districts between 2001 and
2009. This was then used to impute the increase in dwelling stock between 2009 and 2011 for
these 37 districts.
We ended up with 354 observations (including City of London and Isle of Scilly) and computed a
growth variable (dwelling stock in 2011–dwelling stock in 2001/dwelling stock in 2001* 100). A similar
variable was also created between the 2001 and 2008, but the model’s results stayed broadly
unchanged.
Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Dwelling stock growth 354 8.75 3.77 0.16 31.34
Figure A5. Histogram and box plot. Note: Tower Hamlets with a growth rate of 31.3 per cent has been excluded from above graphs
for presentation purposes.
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Owner-occupier households
Proportion of households that are owner-occupiers/private renters/social renters/council renters.
These variables were created using 2001 Census Area Statistics data from the Nomis website
based on Household Reference Person (HRP). By norm, the HRP is the oldest economically active
adult in a household. The census collates HRP data for age categories up to 74 years. The owner-occu-
pier households variable was then = (total number of owner-occupier households in district/total
number of households in district). Population-based estimates were also calculated side by side
for robustness checks.
Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Proportion of owner-occupier households 354 0.72 0.09 0.29 0.89
Figure A6. Growth rates (quartiles).
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Number of major planning applications relative to dwelling stock
Data on major residential planning applications (projects that involve building of 10 or more houses)
were obtained from the DCLG. The total number of such applications made over the period 1998–
2007 was used as a measure of attractiveness of a district (2008 was left out due to data concerns,
that is, signiﬁcant number of missing values, while data past 2009 suffered due to the
reorganisations).
Figure A7. Histogram and box plot.
Figure A8. Owner-occupier proportions (quartiles).
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This measure was divided by dwelling stock in 2001. For missing values of data in 2007, data were
imputed by linear estimation using 2006 and 2008/2009 data. As a robustness check, this variable was
also created by weighting it by population instead of dwelling stock.
Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Planning applications relative to dwelling stock 350 4.15 1.55 0 12.37
Figure A10. Planning applications relative to dwelling stock by district (quartiles). Note: Missing values for Nottingham, York, Isle of
Wight and Isle of Scilly.
Figure A9. Histogram and box plot.
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Developable land
Share of developable land: Using GIS software, the following categories were subtracted from the
total area of each district.
. Built-up land and areas subject to natural restrictions, using Land Cover Map 2000 from the Centre
of Ecology and Hydrology.
. Areas designated as ‘special conservation areas’, ‘special protection areas’, ‘sites of special scientiﬁc
interest’, local and national nature reserves, Ramsar sites, and ‘areas of outstanding natural beauty’,
using data from Natural England website.
. Greenbelts and national parks, using Ofﬁce of National Statistics data.
Land that did not fall into any of these categories was classiﬁed as developable land for the pur-
poses of our analysis.
Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Developable land 354 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.94
Figure A11. Histogram of ‘developable land’ variable.
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Refusal rates
This variable was compiled using the same data set used for the demand variables, where refusal
rates were the percentage of major residential applications refused over the time period 1998–2007.
Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Refusal rates 348 27.83 11.97 4.08 63.87
Figure A12. Built, greenbelt and designated protected areas.
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Figure A14. Refusal rates. Note Missing values for Nottingham, York, Isle of Wight and Isle of Scilly.
Figure A13. Histogram and box plot.
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Political variables
Political variables include party seat share, party majority and uncontrolled districts. All political vari-
ables were created over the 1998–2008 period using data supplied by The Elections Centre at Ply-
mouth University. We stopped this analysis at 2008 due to the 2009 reorganisations, the
assumption being that the growth in dwelling stock over the decade could largely be considered
a function of political decisions made a few years before 2001, and a few years before 2011.
Seat share variables were the average seat share of a particular party in a particular district. Party
majority variables were dummy variables for whether a party had overall control of a particular local
council for more than seven years or whether there was ‘no overall control’. (Parallel variables using
different year benchmarks were also created for robustness checks.)
Table A1. Correlation between dependent variable and independent variables.
Dwelling stock
growth
Owner-occupiers
households
Developable
land
Planning applications relative to
dwelling stock
Dwelling stock growth 1.0000
Owner-occupier households −0.1503
(0.0046)
1.0000
Developable land 0.3621
(0.0000)
0.2938
(0.0000)
1.0000
Planning applications relative to
dwelling stock
0.5060
(0.0000)
0.1382
(0.0096)
0.2309
(0.0000)
1.0000
Figure A15. Local councils marked in red denote ‘NOC’ dominated districts.
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Figure A16. Scatterplot matrix for all major variables. Note: Tower Hamlets with a growth rate of 31.3 per cent has been excluded
from above graph for presentation purposes.
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